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Confederate Carved Pipe Bowl – Captain J. W. Johnson Co. F 9^th Tennessee Cavalry – This finely carved pipe bowl was created by Captain J. W. Johnson of the 9^th Tennessee Cavalry, usually referred to during the war as Biffle’s Cavalry (originally the 19^th Tennessee Cavalry), enumerated such in recognition of the commanding officer, Lt. Col. Jacob Biffle. Jacob Biffle would prove to be a most ingenious tactician and successful cavalry leader throughout the war, in the western theater. Although the records for members of Biffle’s Cavalry are scant, it appears that J.W. Johnson enlisted, at the rank of Captain, in the 9^th Tennessee Cavalry on October 1, 1862 and would serve throughout most of the war, as indicated by the numerous engagements carved into the pipe bowl. At some point, Johnson was captured by Federal forces, although his POW incarceration location is unknown; he is listed as a POW in period Confederate records. It is likely that Johnson created this skillfully carved pipe bowl, during his imprisonment, which, as the dates of the various engagements end with the Battle of Spring Hill in November 1864, may have occurred during that late war engagement.

The pipe bowl appears to be made of bone and has a light heft, not the more dense heft of wood; it depicts, on the front of the bowl, artfully carved, raised, crossed sabers, with a raised number “9” above the intersection of the sabers and a raised letter “F” below the intersection of the sabers; in a raised, forked tail riband across the back of the pipe bowl is incised, on the left half “J. Johnson”, while on the right half of this riband is incised “Capt.”; a second raised, forked riband is carved below the top one – on the left half is incised “CAV.” and on the right side is incised “Tenn.” Captain Johnson also incised in the stem the following: “1861 Co. K Monroe”, “1862 Parker C^rs R^d”, “Thomsn S tn”, “1863 Sand M^tn”, “Chickamauga – 1864 – Spring Hill”.

We have had several soldier carved pipe bowls, all created by Union soldiers; this is the first Confederate soldier’s pipe bowl we have had. This example is not only a rare example of a Confederate created, POW pipe bowl, but one that is quite intricately and artfully created from bone and not wood; the inscriptions on the bowl enumerate the engagements in which the battle-hardened Captain Johnson participated. The pipe bowl remains in excellent condition and evidences having been smoked, giving it a most pleasing, aged coloring and patina.

Measurements: Length (from stem to end of bowl) – 1.75”; Diameter of the bowl – .75”

J. W. Johnson

Residence was not listed.
Enlisted on 10/1/1862 as a Capt.

On 10/1/1862, he was commissioned into “F” Co. Tennessee 19th Cavalry.
(Date and method of discharge not given.)
(Estimated date of enlistment)

Military Service

Officer – Name: J.W. Johnson

Yes

Prisoner of War

Yes

Wounded

No

Discharge

Private

 

J W Johnson

in the U.S., Confederate Soldiers Compiled Service Records, 1861-1865

 

Name	J W Johnson
Rank	Private
Enlistment Date	1 Sep 1862
Enlistment Place	Sumner Co, Tennessee, USA
Military Unit	Ninth (Ward’s) Cavalry

 

U.S., Civil War Prisoner of War Records, 1861-1865 for J W Johnson

Col. Jacob B. Biffle Confederate Cavalry Commander Jacob Barnett Biffle, the son of John Barnett and Mary Chambers Biffle, was born on May 31, 1830 near Ashland in Wayne County, Tennessee. His father was a veteran of the War of 1812 [who served in Samuel B. McKnight’s Company], and son of Jacob C. Biffle, a Revolutionary War veteran. Jake Biffle was a veteran of the Mexican American War (1846-1848). [At the age of 18 he volunteered to serve in the company formed by Albert G. Cooper. Cooper later served as Biffle’s lieutenant-colonel in the 9th Cavalry Regiment.] Although some historians have touted the actions of Forrest and, have shrouded the ability of his field commanders, Colonel Biffle could not be overshadowed with ease. In 1861, then Captain Jacob Biffle assisted with the formation of the 2nd Tennessee Cavalry Battalion, soon afterward, He was promoted to lieutenant-colonel and commanded an entire regiment which became the 9th Tennessee Cavalry Regiment (also called the 19th). Displaying gallantry and valor that was second to none, Biffle’s ingeniousness and brilliance put him on a level that paralleled General Forrest. His knowledge of tactics and how to handle his men in action proved him to be a valuable asset to the Confederate Army of Tennessee. After the war, Colonel Biffle returned home to find Wayne County hostile towards all former Confederates. Sensing the change, Jake packed up his belongings and moved with his wife Sarah to Tupelo, Mississippi. Around 1873, Jake and his family are listed in Myra, Texas, where he had become a cattle rancher, (Myra, Texas was largely populated by ex-Confederate soldiers) it was here the Biffles finally settled to live the remainder of their lives. The history of Colonel Jacob Biffle comes to a sudden close in the winter of 1876-77. On December 15, 1876, while out on a cattle drive, Jake Biffle was shot by a man named Waters, his cook. He died two weeks later and on January 5, 1877, Colonel Jake was buried at the Reed Cemetery in Myra, Texas.

19th Regiment, Tennessee Cavalry (Biffle’s)

Overview:

19th (Biffle’s) Cavalry Regiment, usually known as Biffle’s 9th Cavalry, was organized in October, 1862. The men were from the counties of Wayne, Lawrence, Maury, Perry, Lewis, and Madison. It served in J.B. Biffle’s and Dibrell’s Brigade, and fought at Parker’s Cross Roads, Thompson’s Station, Brentwood, and Chickamauga. Later it skirmished in Tennessee, then was active in the Atlanta Campaign and Forrest’s operations during Hood’s Campaign. It moved to Mississippi and ended the war in Alabama. During December, 1862, this regiment contained about 400 effectives and on May 3, 1865, there were 22 officers and 281 men present. It was included in the surrender of the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana as part of T.H. Bell’s command. The field officers were Colonel Jacob B. Biffle, Lieutenant Colonel Albert G. Cooper, and Major Barclay Martin.

• The 9th Tennessee Cavalry Regiment (Biffle’s) was involved in the Battle of Parker’s Cross Roads on December 31, 1862. The battle took place in Henderson County, Tennessee, during the American Civil War. The 9th Tennessee Cavalry Regiment (Biffle’s) was organized in October 1862.
• The regiment was made up of men from Wayne, Lawrence, Maury, Perry, Lewis, and Madison counties.
• The regiment fought at Parker’s Cross Roads under Colonel Jacob Barnett Biffle.
• During the battle, Confederate artillery gained an early advantage.
• The Confederates reversed front, repelled the Union, and withdrew across the Tennessee River.
• Both sides claimed victory

• The Battle of Parker’s Cross Roadswas fought on December 31, 1862, in Henderson County, Tennessee, during the American Civil War.

·       Background

• As Confederate Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest‘s expedition into West Tennessee neared its conclusion, Union Brig. Gen. Jeremiah C. Sullivan, with the brigades of Cols. Cyrus L. Dunham and John W. Fuller, attempted to cut Forrest off from withdrawing across the Tennessee River.

·       Battle

• of Parker’s Cross Roads Battlefield core and study areas by the American Battlefield Protection Program.
• Dunham’s and Forrest’s march routes brought them into contact at Parker’s Crossroads on December 31, 1862. Skirmishing began about 9 a.m., with Forrest taking an initial position along a wooded ridge northwest of Dunham at the intersection. Confederate artillerygained an early advantage. Dunham pulled his brigade back a half mile and redeployed, facing north. His Federals repelled frontal feints until attacked on both flanks and rear by Forrest’s mounted and dismounted troops.
• During a lull, Forrest sent Dunham a demand for an unconditional surrender. Dunham refused and was preparing for Forrest’s next attack when Fuller’s Union brigade arrived from the north and surprised the Confederates with an attack on their rear; Confederate security detachments had failed to warn of Fuller’s approach. “Charge ’em both ways,” ordered Forrest. The Confederates briefly reversed front, repelled Fuller, then rushed past Dunham’s demoralized force and withdrew south to Lexington, Tennessee.
• After the fight, Forrest was able to cross the Tennessee River. Both sides claimed this battle as a victory – however the Confederate forces withdrew and suffered greater casualties

Thompson’s Station

Other Name:

Campaign:

Middle Tennessee Operations

Date(s):

February-April 1863

Principal Commanders:

Colonel John Coburn [US] Major General Earl Van Dorn [CS]

Forces Engaged:

0 total (US 0; CS 0;)

Estimated Casualties:

1957 total (US 1600; CS 357;)

Description:

In a period of relative inactivity following the Battle of Stones River, a reinforced Union infantry brigade, under Col. John Coburn, left Franklin to reconnoiter south toward Columbia. Four miles from Spring Hill, Coburn attacked with his right wing, a Confederate force composed of two regiments; he was repelled. Then, Maj. Gen. Van Dorn seized the initiative. Brig. Gen. W.H. “Red” Jackson’s dismounted 2nd Division made a frontal attack, while Brig. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest’s division swept around Coburn’s left flank, and into his rear. After three attempts, characterized by hard fighting, Jackson carried the Union hilltop position as Forrest captured Coburn’s wagon train and blocked the road to Columbia in his rear. Out of ammunition and surrounded, Coburn surrendered. Union influence in Middle Tennessee subsided for a while.

Day’s Gap / Sand Mountain

Campaign:

Streight’s Raid: Tuscumbia Alabama Toward Rome Geo

Date(s):

April 1863

Principal Commanders:

Brigadier General Abel Streight [US] Major General Nathan Forrest [CS]

Forces Engaged:

2000 total (US 2000; CS 0;)

Estimated Casualties:

88 total (US 23; CS 65;)

Description:

Union Col. Abel D. Streight led a provisional brigade on a raid to cut the Western & Atlantic Railroad that supplied Gen. Braxton Bragg’s Confederate army in Middle Tennessee. From Nashville, Tennessee, Streight’s command traveled to Eastport, Mississippi, and then proceeded east to Tuscumbia, Alabama, in conjunction with another Union force commanded by Brig. Gen. Grenville Dodge. On April 26, 1863, Streight’s men left Tuscumbia and marched southeast, their initial movements screened by Dodge’s troops. On April 30, Confederate Brig. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest’s brigade caught up with Streight’s expedition and attacked its rearguard at Day’s Gap on Sand Mountain. The Federals repulsed this attack and continued their march to avoid further delay and envelopment. Thus began a running series of skirmishes and engagements at Crooked Creek (April 30), Hog Mountain (April 30), Blountsville (May 1), Black Creek/Gadsden (May 2), and Blount’s Plantation (May 2). Forrest finally surrounded the exhausted Union soldiers near Rome, Georgia, where he forced their surrender on May 3.

Results:

Union Victory

Chickamauga

Catoosa County and Walker County, GA  |  Sep 18 – 20, 1863

The Confederate army secured a decisive victory at Chickamauga but lost 20 percent of its force in battle. After two days of fierce fighting, the Rebels broke through Union lines and forced the Federals into a siege at Chattanooga.

How it ended

Confederate victory. At the end of a summer that had seen disastrous Confederate losses at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the triumph of the Army of Tennessee at Chickamauga was a well-timed turn-around for the Confederates, but it came at a great cost.  Chickamauga was the second bloodiest battle of the Civil War, ranking only behind Gettysburg, and was by far the deadliest battle in the Western Theater.

In context

The small city of Chattanooga, with 2,500 inhabitants, lay on the banks of the Tennessee River where it cut through the Appalachian Mountains. It was the crossroads for four major railroads. President Abraham Lincoln knew that if his army could capture Chattanooga, vital Confederate supply lines would be severed, and the war would be closer to an end.

In the summer of 1863, the Confederate army was reeling from a string of losses in the Western Theater, while the success of the Tullahoma Campaign bolstered the confidence of Union Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans. Targeting Chattanooga, Rosecrans outmaneuvered the Rebel army and forced Confederate general Braxton Bragg to relinquish control of the critical transportation hub without a fight.

Rosecrans assumed that Bragg’s demoralized army would retreat further south into Rome, Georgia.  He divided his army into three corps and scattered them throughout Tennessee and Georgia. But Rosecrans made a mistake—Bragg had in fact concentrated his men at LaFayette, Georgia, where he was expecting reinforcements and was close to a vulnerable corps of Rosecrans’s army. When Bragg’s troops crossed Chickamauga Creek, the Federals had a fight on their hands.

Although Bragg’s original plan was the destruction of the Army of the Cumberland and the recapture of Chattanooga, the results of two days of bitter fighting at Chickamauga stalled him. He decided to occupy the heights surrounding Chattanooga and lay siege to the city instead.  Just two months later, the reinforced Federals drove the Army of Tennessee from their positions around Chattanooga, permanently securing Northern control of the city.  With that loss, the Southern victory at Chickamauga was turned into a strategic defeat.

 Battle of Spring Hill

Date November 29, 1864 Location Maury County, Tennessee Result Union victory
Belligerents
United States of America	Confederate States of America
Commanders and leaders
John M. Schofield	John Bell Hood
Units involved
IV Corps XXIII Corps	Army of Tennessee
Strength
7,000	12,000
Casualties and losses
350 (64 KIA, 281 WIA, ~5 Missing	500 (~120 KIA, ~350 WIA, 25+ missing)

 

The Battle of Spring Hill was fought November 29, 1864, at Spring Hill, Tennessee, as part of the Franklin-Nashville Campaign of the American Civil War. The Confederate Army of Tennessee, commanded by Lt. Gen. John Bell Hood, attacked a Union force under Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield as it retreated from Columbia through Spring Hill. Because of a series of command failures, the Confederates were unable to inflict serious damage on the Federals and could not prevent their safe passage north to Franklin during the night. The next day, Hood pursued Schofield and attacked his fortifications in the Battle of Franklin, resulting in severe Confederate casualties.

Background

Following his defeat in the Atlanta Campaign, Hood had hoped to lure Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman into battle by disrupting his supply lines from Chattanooga to Atlanta. After a brief period in which he pursued Hood, Sherman elected instead to conduct his March to the Sea from Atlanta to Savannah, Georgia. He left forces under the command of Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, the commander of the Army of the Cumberland, to defend Tennessee and defeat Hood: principally the IV Corps from the Army of the Cumberland, commanded by Maj. Gen. David S. Stanley, and the XXIII Corps from the Army of the Ohio, commanded by Maj. Gen. John Schofield.

Hood moved through northern Alabama and concentrated his army at Florence from October 30 to November 21, waiting for supplies and to link up with his newly assigned cavalry commander, Maj. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest. Rather than attempting to pursue Sherman through Georgia, Hood decided to execute a new plan: move north into Tennessee, defeat Thomas’s army before it could concentrate, seize the important manufacturing center of Nashville, and continue north into Kentucky, possibly as far as the Ohio River. From this point, he could travel east to Virginia to join up with Gen. Robert E. Lee at Petersburg. His theater commander, Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard, urged Hood to take immediate action in an attempt to distract Sherman’s advance, emphasizing the importance of moving before Thomas could consolidate his forces.

The Army of Tennessee marched north from Florence on November 21 in three columns: Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham‘s corps on the left, Lt. Gen. Stephen D. Lee‘s in the center, and Lt. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart‘s on the right, all screened aggressively by Forrest’s cavalry. Schofield, who commanded Stanley’s corps as well as his own, retreated in the face of this advance, marching rapidly north from Pulaski to Columbia. The Federals were able to reach Columbia and erect fortifications just hours before the Confederates arrived.

On November 24–29, the “Battle of Columbia” was a series of skirmishes and artillery bombardments against Columbia. On November 28, Thomas directed Schofield to begin preparations for a withdrawal north to Franklin. He was expecting (incorrectly) that Maj. Gen. Andrew J. Smith‘s XVI Corps arrival from Missouri was imminent and he wanted the combined force to defend against Hood on the line of the Harpeth River at Franklin instead of the Duck River at Columbia. Schofield sent his 800-wagon supply train out in front, guarded by part of the IV Corps division of Brig. Gen. George D. Wagner. On the same day, Hood sent the three cavalry divisions under Nathan Bedford Forrest miles east of Columbia, where they crossed the river and headed north.

On November 29 Hood sent Cheatham’s and Stewart’s corps on a flanking march north, crossing the Duck River at Davis’s Ford east of Columbia while two divisions of Lee’s corps and most of the army’s artillery remained on the southern bank to deceive Schofield into thinking a general assault was planned against Columbia. Hood, riding near the head of the column with Cheatham’s corps, planned to interpose his army between Schofield and Thomas, hoping to defeat Schofield as the Federals retreated north from Columbia. Stewart’s corps followed Cheatham, and they were followed by the division of Maj. Gen. Edward “Allegheny” Johnson (Lee’s corps). The rest of Lee’s corps remained south of Columbia, demonstrating with artillery fire against Schofield’s men north of the Duck.

Cavalry skirmishing between Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson‘s Union cavalry and Forrest’s Confederate troopers continued throughout the day as the Confederates advanced. Forrest’s wide turning movement with 4,000 troopers had forced Wilson north to Hurt’s Corner, preventing the Union horsemen from interfering with Hood’s infantry advance. By 10 a.m. on November 29, Forrest ordered his men to turn west toward Spring Hill. Wilson sent multiple messages to Schofield warning of Hood’s advance, but it was not until dawn on November 29 that Schofield believed the reports, understood the deception represented by Lee’s artillery bombardment, and realized the predicament he was in. He sent Stanley north with the IV Corps division of Brig. Gen. Nathan Kimball, the remainder of Wagner’s division, and the bulk of the Federal reserve artillery. Their mission initially was to protect the trains, but also to hold the crossroads at Spring Hill to allow the entire army to withdraw safely to Franklin.

Battle

Forrest’s cavalrymen approached Spring Hill on the Mount Carmel Road and at about 11:30 a.m. ran into pickets from the IV Corps. Stanley had moved north rapidly and formed up positions with Wagner’s division that protected the village of Spring Hill on three sides. To the northwest of the village, the lines of Col. Emerson Opdycke‘s brigade protected the enormous supply trains, Brig. Gen. Luther P. Bradley‘s brigade. Lane’s brigade rushed forward and pushed back the dismounted cavalrymen, primarily Brig. Gen. Frank C. Armstrong‘s Mississippi brigade. Forrest received a message from Hood to hold the position at all hazards until the infantry could arrive. Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne‘s division of Cheatham’s corps arrived midafternoon on Forrest’s left. The cavalrymen, low on ammunition, pulled out of the line and moved north to be ready to cover a further advance of Hood’s army, or to block Schofield’s withdrawal.

Forrest’s men moved south and he directed the brigade of Brig. Gen. Tyree H. Bell of Chalmer’s division to drive off what he thought was a small force of cavalry from a knoll south of McCutcheon’s Creek. They were actually engaging with Bradley’s brigade, which drove them back immediately with heavy artillery support. The chastened Forrest remarked, “They was in there sure enough, wasn’t they, Chalmers?”

The first command miscommunication of the battle took place upon Hood’s arrival as he established his headquarters at the Absalom Thompson house, “Oaklawn”. Cheatham had ordered his division under Maj. Gen. William B. Bate to move against Spring Hill in concert with Cleburne, forming up on the Irishman’s left. Hood then personally ordered Bate to move towards the Columbia Pike and “sweep toward Columbia.” Neither Bate nor Hood bothered to inform Cheatham of this change in orders. Bate’s men advanced about 3,000 yards in battle formation before they reached the pike, a journey taking over two hours. At about 5:30 p.m., his lead element, sharpshooters under Maj. Thomas D. Caswell, fired on a Federal column approaching from their left—Maj. Gen. Thomas H. Ruger‘s division of the XXIII Corps, the vanguard of Schofield’s main body. But before the two divisions could engage in battle, an officer from Cheatham’s staff arrived to insist that Bate follow Cheatham’s original orders and join Cleburne’s attack. Late that night, Bate reported the contact with the Federal column, but Cheatham discounted the importance of the encounter.

Back in Columbia, Schofield became convinced at about 3 p.m. that the Confederates would not attack him there and at 3:30 he joined two brigades from Ruger’s division on the march to Spring Hill. He ordered his remaining force to remain until dark and then join him on the march north. As soon as Schofield departed, Stephen D. Lee coincidentally began an attack against the Union position, although he had considerable difficulty deploying pontoon bridges for the river crossing. By the time the bulk of his two divisions were able to cross, the senior Union commander left behind at Columbia, Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox, began his withdrawal and the final troops departed up the Franklin Pike by 10 p.m.

Cleburne’s 3,000 men began an en echelon attack against Bradley’s brigade at about 4 p.m. From right to left, his brigades were led by Brig. Gens. Mark P. Lowrey, Daniel C. Govan, and Hiram B. Granbury. Bell’s cavalry brigade supported on the right, although they remained low on ammunition and had little effect in the fight. Whereas Cheatham was expecting Cleburne to drive north into Spring Hill, Hood’s intention was to use this formation to sweep toward the turnpike and wheel left to intercept Schofield’s arriving units, but he apparently had not observed the location of the Union positions south of the town. The stairstep echelon formation was therefore less effective against Bradley’s fortified position on their right and front, allowing only Lowrey’s brigade to engage them initially. After Lowrey requested assistance, Cleburne personally led Govan’s Arkansas brigade forward, wheeling them into a northern alignment against Bradley’s right flank. The attack by Govan and Lowrey outflanked Bradley and his men fled in disorder. Cleburne’s two brigades chased them vigorously, and they were stopped short of the turnpike only by heavy fire from the IV Corps artillery, placed earlier by Stanley on a knoll north of the creek.

By this time, Cheatham’s division under Maj. Gen. John C. Brown (Cheatham’s own division before he assumed corps command) had crossed Rutherford Creek and was moved into position by Cheatham for another attack on Spring Hill, on Cleburne’s right. In the gathering darkness, the sounds of Brown’s guns would be the signal for Cleburne’s men to resume their attack. Brown did not attack, however. His brigade commander on the right, Brig. Gen. Otho F. Strahl, reported that there were Union troops in position on his right flank and front and that Forrest’s cavalrymen, promised to protect his right flank, did not seem to be present. Since his brigade under Brig. Gen. States Rights Gist had not yet arrived to join the attack, Brown decided to consult with his corps commander before proceeding.

Cheatham was at that time attempting to find Bate and steer him into the combined attack. Brown sent two staff officers to find Cheatham and halted his troops while he awaited a decision. By the time Cheatham and Brown were able to speak, at around 6:15 p.m., the battlefield was in total darkness, and the two officers decided that an assault conducted then without knowing the condition of their right flank might be a disaster. Cheatham rode off to Hood’s headquarters to consult with the army commander. Hood was furious that the attack had not proceeded as he intended and that the pike was still open. Cheatham said that he needed assistance from Stewart to protect his right flank, so Hood dispatched a staff officer to find Stewart. Having been up since 3 a.m., Hood was by this time very fatigued. He indulged in a large dinner at Oaklawn, which included considerable “toasting” of drinks, and went to bed at 9 p.m., confident that whatever setbacks his army had suffered during the day, they would be able to correct them in the morning and bag Schofield.

Earlier in the afternoon, Hood had brought up Stewart’s corps across Rutherford Creek and directed him to move north of Spring Hill and cut off the Federal column. After taking a wrong turn, Stewart ended up at Forrest’s headquarters at the Caldwell house. There he conferred with Forrest about the positions of the army, when suddenly one of Cheatham’s staff officers arrived and directed in Hood’s name that Stewart’s corps move to support Brown’s attack. After Stewart’s column retraced its route, he arrived at Brown’s command post, but was confused about the apparent disagreement in orders he was receiving, so he traveled back to Hood’s headquarters for clarification. He informed Hood that because his men were tired and had been on the move since daylight—it was now 11 p.m.—he had ordered them to bivouac while they waited. Hood accepted the situation and told Stewart to head in the direction of Franklin in the morning after the men had rested.

Aftermath

The Battle of Spring Hill was a minor affair in terms of casualties—about 350 Union and 500 Confederate—but the result of miscommunication and simply bad military management was that during the night all of Schofield’s command, including Cox, passed from Columbia through Spring Hill while the Confederate commanders slept. The passage of the army did not go unnoticed by some of the soldiers, but no concerted effort was made to block the pike. Brig. Gen. Lawrence S. Ross‘s cavalry brigade attempted to block the passage of the supply trains north of Spring Hill, at Thompson’s Station, but accompanying Federal infantry drove them off. A private soldier woke up the commanding general at 2 a.m. and reported he saw the Union column moving north, but Hood did nothing beyond sending a dispatch to Cheatham to fire on passing traffic.

By 6:00 a.m. on November 30, all of Schofield’s army was well north of Spring Hill and its vanguard had reached Franklin, where it began to build breastworks south of town. In the morning Hood discovered Schofield’s escape, and after an angry conference with his subordinate commanders in which he blamed all but himself for the failure, ordered his army to resume its pursuit, setting up the disastrous Battle of Franklin that afternoon.

The Spring Hill incident was an object lesson in the breakdown of command responsibility and communication. Hood was partially responsible. He had come to Spring Hill with no plan save to outrace Schofield to Nashville. His absence from the field made him ignorant of several crucial matters. When he finally had learned by midnight that the Rebel line was not facing the pike, he still shunned personal observation, being too confident of Schofield’s position.

Thomas L. Connelly, Autumn of Glory

Spring Hill had been, arguably, Hood’s best chance to isolate and defeat the Union army (Thomas L. Connelly, historian of the Army of Tennessee, argues that the importance of Spring Hill has been overblown and that Schofield had three alternative routes to either Franklin or Nashville.) Recriminations for the lost opportunity soon began flying. Rumors circulated about Brown being drunk, but they were never substantiated and he was later elected governor of Tennessee. Hood believed that Cheatham was most responsible, although he also had criticism for two of Cheatham’s division commanders, Cleburne and Brown. His official report said, “Major-General Cheatham was ordered to attack the enemy at once vigorously and get possession of the pike, and, although these orders were frequently and earnestly repeated, he made but a feeble and partial attack, failing to reach the point indicated.” Historians Thomas L. Connelly, Eric Jacobson, and Wiley Sword have each assigned blame to both Hood and Cheatham.

A variety of theories about Hood’s personal failures have occupied historians for years. One of the more persistent is that the general was debilitated from ingesting laudanum in the evening, attempting to relieve the pain and irritation to his amputated leg by the long, damp ride over rough roads that day. Eric Jacobson’s book, For Cause & for Country, lists many authors who have supported this story, but he states that “there is no evidence that Hood took any sort of drugs, or even alcohol, at Spring Hill.”